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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
V. 
LACEY ANN JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20140310-CA 
Appellant is not incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the State correctly concedes Lacey Johnson was erroneously convicted of one 
count of uttering a threat of violence, and both in-concert enhancements to the counts of 
threat of violence and retaliation. SB.11-12. As those erroneous convictions lack any 
legal basis whatsoever they must be reversed and dismissed with prejudice. 
The only remaining issue is whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence 
from which to conclude, from a reasonable inference and beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Lacey "direct[ed a] threat or action" at Jay, exclusively "as retaliation or retribution." 
Utah Code§ 76-8-508.3(2)(b)(ii). There is no question that the answer is no. 
The State agrees this jury could make a "reasonable inference that the attack was 
because Jay had provoked" Lacey; and it acknowledges that its theory of guilt is "not 
necessarily mutually exclusive" to Lacey's theory of innocence, as Lacey "could very 
well have assaulted Jay as pay back for his calling the cops and for the things he said to 
her that night." SB.18,19. Yet, while the State claims the jury could simply choose which 
reasonable alternative to believe (SB.18), decades of Utah cases belie that claim. Indeed, 
our courts reverse in this situation, where the State's evidence "did not preclude the 
reasonable alternative hypothesis presented by the defense," as '"reasonable minds must 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt."' State v. Buck, 2009 
UT App 2, ,rl4, 200 P.3d 674 (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986)). 
Thus, and for the reasons set forth in this brief, the opening brief, and the state's brief, 
Lacey's conviction for retaliation should be summarily reversed and vacated. 
I. THE STATE CORRECTLY CONCEDES THAT LACEY'S 
THREE CONVICTIONS FOR ONE COUNT OF THREAT OF 
VIOLENCE AND TWO IN-CONCERT ENHANCEMENTS, 
MUST ALL BE REVERSED AND VACATED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
The State correctly concedes Lacey was erroneously convicted of three 
charges. It was error to enter a conviction and sentence in this case for the count of 
uttering a threat of violence, which was enhanced to a class-A-misdemeanor 
through the in-concert enhancement, where neither of those offenses were ever 
submitted to a jury. See OB.14-23;SB.10-12. The State does not dispute that 
double jeopardy prevents Lacey's retrial on those charges (OB.23-24), thus this 
Court should remand with an order that the enhanced conviction and sentence be 
reversed and vacated with prejudice. 
Similarly, the State correctly concedes the error in entering the conviction 
and enhanced sentence for in-concert retaliation, where the enhancement does not 
statutorily apply to the offense of retaliation. See OB.24-30; SB.12. This Court 
2 
~-. 
'-9 
should therefore remand with an order to reverse and vacate the enhanced 
conviction for retaliation as well. 
II. LACEY'S CONVICTION FOR RETALIATION MUST ALSO 
BE VACATED WHERE AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, 
WITH JAY'S INDEPENDENT THREATS AND ACTIONS, 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO EXCLUDE THE 
REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT LACEY DID NOT 
DIRECT A THREAT OR ACTION SOLELY AS 
RETALIATION. 
The State acknowledges the circumstantial evidence in this case made it 
reasonable to infer that Lacey kicked Jay high in the back of his thigh under his buttocks, 
in response to his violent threats and insults that he hurled at Lacey. SB.17-19. Where the 
State concedes that its evidence did not preclude this reasonable hypothesis of innocence, 
this Court must reverse her conviction for retaliation. See OB.31-36; see also SB.19 
(citing Buck, 2009 UT App 2, ,r13); see also State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 411-12 (Utah 
1978) ("the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the 
defendant's guilt"). 
A retaliation conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant "direct[] the threat or action ... as retaliation or retribution against the witness, 
victim, or informant." Utah Code§§ 76-8-508.3(2)(b),(i),(ii); see OB.31-43. The State 
relied on circumstantial evidence for Lacey's mens rea for retaliation charge; but where 
that circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable inference that Lacey acted in 
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response to Jay's independent provocation and not solely as retaliation, it was error to 
send the State's retaliation charge to the jury. 1 
Indeed, the evidence in this case made it reasonable, if not significantly more 
likely that Lacey reacted to Jay's intervening and vicious provocation, rather than acting 
with the exclusive mens rea for retaliation. OB.38-39;OB.34-35 (Jay told Lacey, "if she 
tried using a [T]aser on" him, that he would "shove it down her throat," Jay also told 
Lacey "[ w ]hy don't you get high and pass out on another one of your babies, bitch," 
knowing it would "affect her");OB.42-43 ("The only reasonable inference from this 
evidence is that her acts were defensive and not retaliatory");OB.42-43 ("To say that in 
this case, Lacey acted with the conscious objective to retaliate against Jay for his role in 
an official proceeding, and not merely in defense of Jay's harassment, "require[s] 
speculative leaps over yawning gaps in the evidence."). 
The State suggests the jury could simply accept "the reasonable inference" that 
Lacey "was mad at Jay and his wife for calling police on her and her dog, and that she 
then assaulted Jay as payback." SB.17; see also SB.18-19 ( claiming nonetheless that "the 
existence of competing reasonable inferences still requires that the trial court submit the 
case to the jury." SB.18-19 (citing Buck, 2009 UT App 2, iJ13); SB.19 (claiming no 
"settled Utah law" requires "that the State had to prove retaliation was her sole 
motivation"). The State's claim contravenes settled Utah law, where it also acknowledges 
1 The State relied on circumstantial evidence to infer this element. See OB.32-36 
(marshaling the circumstantial evidence); 36-43 (arguing the inferences drawn therefrom 
are insufficient to prove specific intent to retaliate); see also SB.17-20 ( discussing the 
reasonableness of inferences to prove this element). 
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"the jury could also draw a reasonable inference that the attack was because Jay had 
provoked her with the death of her child." SB.18 ( emphasis added); see also SB.19 
( claiming "the two inferences ... are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Defendant 
could very well have assaulted Jay as pay back for his calling the cops and for the things 
he said to her that night."). 
However, our cases instruct that where "the evidence and inferences did not 
preclude the reasonable alternative hypothesis presented by the defense" that "evidence 
is so insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt."' Buck, 2009 UT App 2, if 14 ( quotation 
omitted) (emphasis added). This is true because, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if 
it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of 
guilt." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ifl 8, 63 P.3d 94 (alteration original); see also 
OB.32-42 (Court cannot make "speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence."). 
That our Courts reverse in this situation was recently reaffirmed in State v. 
Gallegos. 2015 UT App 78. There the Court reversed the denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict where the evidence was similarly insufficient to prove the defendant's mens rea 
beyond mere speculation. The City argued in that case, that there was "sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable inference" of the defendant's guilt. Id.,IIO. This Court 
agreed, but noted this was not the end of the inquiry on appeal, where the City's claim 
was based on "no more than speculation." Id. The Court reaffirmed, '" [ w ]hen the 
evidence supports more than one possible conclusion, none more likely than the other, 
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the choice of one possibility over another can be no more than speculation.'" Id. ( quoting 
State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, iJ16, 238 P.3d 1096). 
Gallegos is only the most recent in a panoply of cases requiring that where a case 
is "dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence" those "circumstances must be such as 
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt of the offense 
charged that every circumstance constituting a necessary link in the chain of evidence 
must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence." State 
v. Crawford, 201 P. 1030, 1033 (Utah 1921); see also State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285,302 
(1941) ("where the proof of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon circumstantial 
evidence, such circumstances must be such as to reasonably exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than the existence of such fact and be consistent with its existence and 
inconsistent with its non-existence."); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) 
("When the only proof of presumed facts consists of circumstantial evidence, the 
circumstances must reasonably preclude every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's 
innocence."). 2 
2 State v. Thompson does not help the State. See SB.20 (citing 2005 UT App 502 (mem)). 
The State argues it stands for the proposition that evidence was sufficient even "where 
the evidence showed Thompson could have multiple reasons for retaliating against the 
victim." SB.20. That was not the holding in Thompson, where the defense was that no 
evidence showed his guilt, not that there was also a reasonable hypothesis of Thompson's 
innocence. See 2005 UT App 502 ("Thompson argues that there was no evidence that he 
intentionally or knowingly struck the victim in retaliation for her role in the pending 
cases," thus the jury simply made that reasonable inference of guilt). Moreover, 
Thompson involved a charge of tampering with a witness, which does not require the 
element of retaliation that Lacey challenges here, that of proof the actor direct a threat or 
action, "as retaliation or retribution." Utah Code§ 76-8-508.3(2)(b)(ii). 
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Indeed, to find Lacey guilty of retaliation here would "require[] not just one level 
of inference but two," if not more. Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78, ,IlO (citation omitted). 
First, that Lacey ever actually intended to somehow retaliate against Jay specifically. And 
then that even though Jay approached her, at her house, at night, where he violently 
threatened her, that she did not react to him but was only motivated to the desire to 
retaliate. However, "[ w ]bile inferences drawn from facts in evidence are appropriate, 
inferences drawn from inferences are not." Id. (citations omitted). And where the 
evidence failed to "exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt" 
it was error to send this case to the jury. John, 586 P.2d at 411-12. 
The State's evidence was insufficient to prove its charged offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It was therefore plain and obvious error to send the retaliation charge to 
the jury. OB.43-44. Alternatively, for the same reasons, defense counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object, in any way, to the insufficiency of the evidence of retaliation, which 
prejudiced Lacey via an invalid conviction and sentence. OB.44-45. Under either 
standard, this Court must vacate Lacey's conviction for retaliation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this and the Opening Brief, Lacey's enhanced 
convictions for threat of violence and retaliation must be vacated, and because the 
evidence is insufficient to uphold her retaliation conviction, it too must be vacated. 
SUBMITTED this f ~ r- day of April, 2014. 
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